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Abstract
This Note focuses on the laws of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United
Kingdom as they affect part-time workers in the United Kingdom. Part I provides a general back-
ground to the equal pay laws of the EEC and the United Kingdom. Part II traces the legislative
history of these laws and analyzes whether the administrative and legislative bodies of the EEC
and the United Kingdom intended to apply equal pay laws to part-time workers. Part III chrono-
logically reviews the case law and examines the difficulties encountered by tribunals interpreting
the equal pay laws. Finally, Part IV analyzes the European Court of Justice’s disregard for the
legislative intent behind the equal pay laws and discusses the confusion created by this disregard
for courts in the United Kingdom.
APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF THE EEC AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM TO PART-TIME WOMEN
WORKERS
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom became a member of the European
Economic Community (EEC or Community) in 1972.1 During
the past decade, over ninety percent of part-time workers in
the EEC were female, and in the United Kingdom an even
greater percentage were female. 2 Historically, part-time work-
ers in the United Kingdom have not been paid the same hourly
wages as their full-time male counterparts.' Thus, because
they are primarily women, part-time workers may be subject to
indirect discrimination.4
1. The European Economic Community (EEC or Community) was formed by
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (unoffi-
cial English translation) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. The EEC Treaty was ini-
tially signed by Italy, France, Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands. Id. preamble. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland joined in 1972 with
the signing of the Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom,
Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 11 I.L.M. 397. Greecejoined
in 1979. Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, May 28, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM., 18 I.L.M. 897. Portugal and Spain will become members onJanuary 1, 1986.
See Lisbon and Madrid Agree on Entering Common Market, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
2. Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 911, 930, 31 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 24, 29 (Preliminary Ruling), remanded, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. 388 (Emp. App.
Trib.). In the United Kingdom women comprised 90% of the part-time work force.
Id. Most of these women work part-time because of family responsibilities. GOV'T OF
U.K., DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT, MANPOWER PAPER No. 11, WOMEN & WORK A REVIEW 49
(1973). In fact approximately 85.1% of part-time female workers in the EEC are
married. Robinson, Part-time Employment in the European Community, 118 INT'L LAB.
REV. 299, 301 (1979). Consequently, because part-time workers are not paid the
same hourly wage as full-time workers, the unequal wage has fallen almost exclu-
sively on women, and more specifically, on married women. Id. at 304-05.
3. Robinson, supra note 2, at 304; see Docksey, Part-time Workers, Iqdirect Discrimi-
nation and Redundancy, 46 MOD. L. REV. 504, 505 (1983). "Indeed, part-time workers
are so very likely to be women that it is difficult in practice to regard a requirement of
full-time work as gender-neutral at all." Id. See generally Barrett, Part-Time Workers and
Equal Pay, 6 HUM. RTS. REV. 174, 175 (1981) (part-time workers do not generally
receive the same wages as full-time workers.)
4. See infra notes 143-239 and accompanying text. Discrimination is the failure
to treat all people equally based on sex, race, religion, etc. BALLENTINE'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969). An employer may discriminate against women in a vari-
ety of ways, not just by inadequately compensating them. S. Ross & A. BARCHER,
THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 32-33 (1983). "[I]ndirect discrimination describes the case
513
514 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:513
The European Court of Justice 5 and the Employment Ap-
peals Tribunal6 (EAT) interpret United Kingdom and EEC
laws pertaining to part-time workers in the United Kingdom
and throughout the EEC.7 Both tribunals have had to resolve
two major issues with respect to part-time female workers:
whether indirect discrimination violates the equal pay laws8 of
the EEC and the United Kingdom,' and, whether part-time
workers should be treated in the same manner as full-time
workers.1°
A suit was brought by the EEC against the United King-
dom because the United Kingdom had failed to satisfy its obli-
where two categories of people, identified by characteristics other than sex, are
treated differently in a way which has a disproportionate adverse effect on women."
Barrett, supra note 3, at 176. Therefore, if a certain policy or practice is imposed
upon workers, having nothing to do with their gender, but it adversely effects many
more women than it does men, it would be considered indirect discrimination. See
Clarke v. Eley (IMI) Kynoch, Ltd., 1982 Indus. Rel. L.R. 482, 483 (Emp. App. Trib.);
Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393; Steiner, Sex Discrimination Under the UK and EEC
Law: Two Plus Four Equals One, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 399, 402 (1983); Townshend-
Smith, The Impact of European Law on Equal Pay for Women, in THE EFFECT ON ENGLISH
DOMESTIC LAW OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND RATIFICATION OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 69, 91 (1981).
5. The European Court ofJustice is empowered to "ensure that in the interpre-
tation and application of. . .[the EEC] Treaty the law is observed." EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 164. The Court ofJustice also decides on the validity of decisions of
the Council of Ministers or the Commission. A. WALSH &J. PAXTON, INTO EUROPE 52
(2d ed. 1972). A member state, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, or any
person affected by a Community decision may bring an action in the Court ofJustice.
Id. It is made up of nine judges and four advocate generals. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG,
THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 5-296.6, 5-290 (1984).
6. The Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) receives appeals from the indus-
trial tribunals on questions of law. R. RIDEOUT, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL LAW 2 (1980).
Appeals from the EAT go to the court of appeal. Id.
7. See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
8. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65; Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 (equal pay
laws of the United Kingdom); EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 119 (equal pay law of the
EEC).
9. SeeJenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. 388 (holding that indirect discrimination is
prohibited unless it can be shown to be "objectively necessary"); Handley v. Mono,
1978 Indus. Rel. L.R. 534 (Emp. App. Trib.) (holding that all an employer needs to
do is disprove any intent to discriminate); infra notes 161-74, 208-15 and accompany-
ing text.
10. See Clarke, 1982 Indus. Rel. L.R. 482 (holding that an employer cannot fire
part-time workers before firing full-time workers; both must be treated equally);Jen-
kins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. 388 (holding that unless the employer can show proveable
reasons for discriminating against part-time workers they should be paid the same
wages as full-time workers); infra notes 208-15, 228-35.
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gations pursuant to EEC regulations" and had failed to amend
its equal pay laws to accommodate suits brought for equal pay
for work of equal value.' 2 The United Kingdom lost the suit,
and in 1983, amended its equal pay laws.' 3 Because no part-
time employment cases have been decided since this amend-
ment it is questionable what impact, if any, the amendment will
have on part-time workers.
This Note focuses on the laws of the EEC and i-he United
Kingdom as they affect part-time workers in the United King-
dom. Part I provides a general background to the equal pay
laws of the EEC and the United Kingdom. Part II traces the
legislative history of these laws and analyzes whether the ad-
ministrative and legislative bodies of the EEC and the United
Kingdom intended to apply equal pay laws to part-time work-
ers. Part III chronologically reviews the case law and examines
the difficulties encountered by tribunals interpreting the equal
pay laws. Finally, Part IV analyzes the European Court ofJus-
tice's disregard for the legislative intent behind the equal pay
laws and discusses the confusion created by this disregard for
courts in the United Kingdom.
I. HISTORY OF THE STATUTES
A. EEC Statutes
The EEC was established in 1957 by the signing and ratifi-
cation of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community' 4 (EEC Treaty or Treaty). The purpose of the
EEC is to establish among the states a harmonious coexistence
of the laws that would discourage competition, encourage
closer ties, promote a rise in the standard of living, and create
a common market.' 5 By enacting the EEC Treaty, the member
11. Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2601, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8853, at 8051.
12. Id. at 2604-05, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8853, at 8053.
13. See Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 amended by STAT. INST. 1983/1794.
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, preamble.
15. Id. art. 2. The purpose of the Treaty is to promote "a harmonious develop-
ment of economic activities . . . an accelerated raising of the standard of living and
closer relations between the states belonging to it." Id. The concept "which under-
lies. . .[the EEC Treaty] is that the merging of the six [now 10] economies will make
for a more rapid and stable economic progress; and that in the enlarged economy,
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states sought to lessen the economic and social discrepancies
among themselves, thus making them more evenly competi-
tive.' 6 Part III, title III of the EEC Treaty concerns social pol-
icy.17 Its purpose is to harmonize the social policies of the
member states.' 8  Article 119 outlines the principle of equal
pay for men and women for equal work.' 9
The equal pay principle of article 119 is a prime example
of the harmonization process called for in title 111.20 At the
time of the Treaty's negotiation, France was more liberal2'
than other member states in its application of an equal pay pol-
icy." France insisted upon the recognition of an equal pay
free and fair competition has to be ensured." M. SHANKS &J. LAMBERT, THE COM-
MON MARKET TODAY-AND TOMORROW 45 (1962).
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. This article provides in pertinent part that
"the activities of the Community shall include ... the institution of a system ensur-
ing that competition in the common market is not distorted." Id. art. 3(0.
17. Id. part III, title III. The social policy of the EEC is found in articles 117-22
of the EEC Treaty. This policy attempts to harmonize the laws of the member states
concerning labor, labor standards, and "general social welfare." 3 H. SMIT & P.
HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-715.
18. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 118. This article provides in pertinent part
that it shall be the aim of the Commission to promote "close cooperation between
Member States in the social field." Id.
19. Id. art. 119. Article 119 provides that:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should re-
ceive equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of the Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum
wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind,
which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employ-
ment from his employer.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(A) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the
basis of the same unit of measurement;
(B) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
Id.
20. See id. art. 117. "Member States agree upon the need to promote improved
working conditions and improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possi-
ble their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained." Id. Since the
laws of the EEC Treaty will allow for improvement, an improvement by all states at
the same pace was desired. Article 119 provides that womens' wages in all the mem-
ber states will improve; not just in those states that have national pay laws. Id. art.
119; see also A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAw 358 (1981) (discussing approximation of
laws in various articles of the EEC Treaty).
21. The French "liberality" was demonstrated by the fact that it had already
enacted its own equal pay law. 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-752.
22. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTI-
TUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 1089 (1976). "When the Treaty was entered into, France
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principle by other member states because economic distor-
tion 23 would result if employers in member states were permit-
ted to pay female workers lower wages than their male coun-
terparts for the same work.24 Member states not adhering to
an equal pay principle would have a cheaper labor force than
France and, therefore, an unfair competitive advantage. 2 The
French position was in keeping with the drafter's sta:ed policy
of preventing practices that have as their goal or outcome "the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition." ' 26 The
other drafting states agreed with France that to have some
member states applying the principle of equal pay without re-
quiring the other states to apply the same principle would dis-
tort competition. 7
B. United Kingdom Statutes
The movement for an equal pay statute in the United
Kingdom has a long history. In 1882, the Trade Union Con-
gress 28 passed a resolution that demanded equal pay for wo-
men. 29 This resolution was never enacted because few women
were involved in the union, and other union considerations
took precedence.3 0  In 1918, a committee from the govern-
ment that was examining the question of equal pay recom-
mended that women who did the same or similar work as men
should be paid equally.3' However, the committee's recom-
was further ahead than the other Member States . . . in the implementation of the
principle of equal pay." Id.
23. Id.
24. 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-752.
25. Id. "France, in particular, had enacted rules which were more favorable to
workers and more costly to employers than . . . in some other countries." Id.
26. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1).
27. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 20, at 358.
28. The Trade Union Congress is a major labor federation with over 100 affili-
ates. J. WINDMULLER & A. GLADSTONE, EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS 10 (1984).
29. Chiplin & Sloane, Equal Pay in Great Britain, in EQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN 9, 17
(B. Pettman ed. 1977). This was in response to a matchgirls' strike calling for equal
pay. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 18. Ironically, Beatrice Webb, an ardent feminist, in a foreshadowing
of later problems, rejected the committee's proposal as too vague. The ambiguity
she envisioned stemmed from the question: what was equal pay to be given for-
equal product, equal time, or equal effort. Id. This is in fact the precise issue cur-
rently facing the courts. See infra notes 143-239 and accompanying texic.
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mendation was overlooked as unemployment became worse.32
In 1964, the Labor Party came into power promising equal
pay for equal work, and in 1970, it fulfilled its promise by en-
acting the Equal Pay Act. 3 The Equal Pay Act, however, had a
limited impact.3 4 The Act provides only for equal pay 5 while
ignoring other forms of discrimination. Employment discrimi-
nation can include discrimination in hiring, access to promo-
tion, training, benefits, unequal social security benefits, and
discrimination because of marital status. 6 By identifying equal
pay as the only form of employment discrimination, the Equal
Pay Act ignored these other forms of discrimination. Some
legislators recognized that the Equal Pay Act would have a det-
rimental impact on female workers, because employers would
no longer hire women if they could not pay them less than
men.3 7 Therefore, in 1975 the Labor Government enacted the
Sex Discrimination Act,38 which broadened discrimination laws
to include not only equal pay requirements but also policies
such as nondiscriminatory hiring and firing, and indirect dis-
crimination. 9
Both the EEC and United Kingdom statutes are ambigu-
32. Chiplin & Sloane, supra note 29, at 13.
33. 1970, ch. 41.
34. Seear, Implementing Equal Pay and Equal Opportunity Legislation in Great Britain
in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN 261, 265 (R. Ratner ed. 1980).
35. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(2). "An equality clause is a provision which
relates to terms . . . of a contract under which a woman is employed." Id.
36. The Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, recognizes the myriad ways in
which employment discrimination may manifest itself. See infra note 39.
37. See Seear, supra note 34, at 265.
38. 1975, ch. 65.
39. Id. § 6(l)-(2). The Act provides that:
(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at an estab-
lishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman-
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who
should be offered that employment, or
(b) in the terms on which he offers her that employment, or
(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.
(2) It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at
an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her-
(a) in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion,
transfer or training, or to any other benefits, facilities or services, or by
refusing or deliberately ommitting to afford her access to them
(b) by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment.
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ous. 40  Thus, the courts have interpreted the laws inconsis-
tently and sometimes incorrectly. They have failed to provide
individuals with those rights the legislature intended them to
have.41
II. STA TUTORY ANAL YSIS
A. EEC Law
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty provides that women
should be paid wages equal to men who are doing the same
work.42 However, it is unclear how the equal pay principle in
article 119 applies to part-time workers.43 It is necessary first
to examine how article 119 applies to all female workers, and
then to analyze the legislative intent behind the equal pay laws
of the EEC to see how they apply to part-time female workers
in particular.
1. General Applicability
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty outlines the principle of
equal pay for men and women 4 4 in one of the few "precise"
rules in the Treaty that deal with social policy. 45 The article
specifies that men and women should receive the same pay for
equal work.4 6 If men and women do the same work at piece
rates, i.e. if they are paid for how much they produce, then
they will be paid according to the same unit of measurement.47
For example, if a man gets paid a U.K.1 £ per shirt, then a
woman doing the same work should receive the same wage. If
40. See infra notes 49, 95 and accompanying text.
41. See generally Barrett, supra note 3, at 189-90 (there is room "for a more pur-
posive development of Article 119 to be made by the [European Court of Justice].
Such a development would be more in keeping. . . with the aims of Article 119 and
with the current policy of the Community institutions .... ").
42. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 119; see supra note 19 (for the provisions of
article 119).
43. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
44. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 119.
45. Compare id. art. 118 ("the Commission shall have the task of promoting close
cooperation between Member States in the social field, particularly in matters relat-
ing to: employment; labor law and working conditions; basic and advanced voca-
tional training .... ") and id. art. 120 ("Member States shall endeavor to maintain
the existing equivalence between paid holiday schemes") with id. art. 119 (stating
precisely when female workers should be paid equally to male workers),
46. Id. art. 119.
47. See id. art. I19(a).
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they are paid at hourly rates for the same job, then men and
women should be paid according to the same time rates.48
Thus, the rule seems to clearly outline the requirements for
compliance. However, the meaning of "equal work" in article
119 is unclear,49 and this has allowed for discrepancies in the
interpretation of article 119 by the courts.5 °
An interpretation of the equal pay principle can be made
by examining the direct statutory precursor of article 1 19,51
the International Labor Organization Convention No. 10052
(ILO Convention). The International Labor Organization
(ILO) was established in 1919, in response to employment
problems throughout the world.5 3 The principle of equal pay
was one of the principles included in the preamble to the con-
stitution of the ILO.54 In 1951, the ILO Convention outlined
the methods to achieve equal pay, providing that the "princi-
ple of equal remuneration for men and women" would be
equal pay "for work of equal value. ' 5 5 Every drafting member
of the EEC was also a member of the ILO.5 6 Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that when France insisted upon the
adoption of an equal pay provision in the EEC Treaty, the
drafters of the Treaty referred to this provision in the ILO
Convention.57
Article 119 did not adopt the exact language of the ILO
48. See id. art. l19(b).
49. See Steiner, supra note 4, at 420.
50. See infra notes 216-39 and accompanying text.
51. 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-758.
52. June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter cited as ILO Convention].
53. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, 49
Stat. 2712, T.S. No. 874, 225 Parry's T.S. 373 [hereinafter cited as ILO Constitu-
tion]. The ILO was established as part of the Treaty of Versailles. See id.; D. MORSE,
THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE I.L.O. AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
4-5 (1969).
54. See ILO Constitution, supra note 53, preamble. "[A]n improvement of...
[labor] conditions is urgently required . . . including. . . the protection of. . .wo-
men .... ." Id.; see G. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 160
(1970).
55. G. JOHNSTON, supra note 54, at 161; see ILO Convention, supra note 52, art.
1 (a).
56. 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-758. Compare EEC Treaty, supra
note 1, preamble with ILO Convention, supra note 52, preamble. Great Britain rati-
fied the ILO Convention on June 15, 1972. Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 88 (Cmd. 5039).
57. See generally 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-758. ("[a]rticle 119 of
the Treaty was modelled in part on the Convention No. 100, to which all Member
States except Ireland are parties.").
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Convention. It merely states that equal pay will be given for
equal work, rather than stating that equal pay will be given for
work of equal value.5' The provision in the ILO Convention
calling for equal pay for work of equal value made that docu-
ment a much broader instrument than article 119, in that its
scope encompasses more women. 59 The decision by the draft-
ing members of the EEC not to adopt the wording of the ILO
Convention may have stemmed from a belief that the language
was too broad to be applied to all member states. In addition
the EEC Treaty was to be binding on those ratifying it,60 while
the ILO Convention was not immediately legally binding on
those states who were members of the ILO.61 Therefore, any
signatories of the EEC Treaty who did not already have a na-
tional equal pay law could have been wary of being bound by
the sweeping language in the ILO Convention.62
As a result, article 119 was too narrow.63 The problem
with article 119 was that the term, "equal pay for equal work,"
applied in only three or four percent of the cases where women
were discriminated against when performing the same job as
their male counterparts. 64 The Council of Ministers65 enlarged
the applicability of article 119 when it drafted and put into ef-
fect a council directive, 66 Directive 75/117, which more closely
58. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 119.
59. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-757-58. If article 119 was read
to apply only in situations where female workers did the same job as male workers,
then it would only apply in three to four percent of cases. Id. at 3-757. Therefore, it
should be read more broadly, like the ILO Convention, to apply to "equivalent" jobs.
Id. at 3-758.
60. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 247.
61. See ILO Constitution, supra note 53, art. 405. The decisions of the Conven-
tion do not have immediate force of law. Id. The delegates to the ILO are obligated
to submit Conventions or Recommendations, to their national governments that are
adopted by two-thirds majority of the ILO delegates. Id.; see G. JOHNSTON, supra note
54, at 91.
62. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-757.
63. Id. at 3-758.
64. Id. at 3-757.
65. The Council of Ministers is made up of representatives from each of the
member states. A. WALSH &J. PAXTON, supra note 5, at 50. The Council's purpose as
expressed in the EEC Treaty is "[t]o ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty
are attained ...[and to] ensure co-ordination of the general economic policies of
the Member State." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 145. Some authors argue that the
Council has a superior position over other institutional organs of the Conmunity. 4
H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 5-94, 5-95.
66. Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States
1985]
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aligns the equal pay provisions of the EEC with those of the
ILO Convention. 67 Directive 75/117 expands the principle of
equal pay, outlined in article 119, to include equal pay for work
of equal value. 68 The EEC equal pay laws, like the ILO Con-
vention, now encompass not only a woman who does the same
work as a man but also a woman whose work is of the same
value as a man's.
2. Applicability of the EEC Equal Pay Laws to Part-time
Workers
The intention of the legislative and administrative bodies
of the EEC was that article 119 and Directive 75/117 should
apply not only to full-time female employees doing the same
work as full-time male employees, but to part-time female em-
ployees doing the same work as full-time male employees.69
Therefore, part-time female employees should be paid at the
same wage rate as their full-time male counterparts. The Com-
mission of the European Communities7 ° and the Council of
Ministers have stated this view on several occasions. In a 1979
Council Resolution,7" the Council of Ministers noted that the
Community's approach to the problem of part-time workers
should be based on the principle that "part-time workers . . .
have the same social rights and obligations as full-time work-
ers."'72 The Economic and Social Committee 73 wrote that part-
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women, 26
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 19 (1975), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9718, at 9597 [hereinafter cited as Directive 75/117]. A directive is
binding on the member states and the member state may choose the method to be
used to attain the purpose of the directive. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189; see A.
WALSH & J. PAXTON, supra note 5, at 50.
67. Compare ILO Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(a) with EEC Treaty, supra note
1, art. 119 and Directive 75/117, supra note 66, art. 1.
68. Directive 75/117, supra note 66, art. 1.
69. See generally Barrett, supra note 3, passim.
70. The Commission is made up of fourteen members since the accesion of
Greece. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 157. See id. art. 155 for an outline of the
functions and powers of the Commission. "The Commission's powers are diverse in
nature and may be of a legislative, executive, administrative, and even judicial na-
ture." 4 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 5-186.
71. Council Resolution on the Adaptation of Working Time, 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 2) 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Council Resolution]. A resolution is a
request made to the Commission asking the Commission to do a study or submit a
proposal on a specific topic. 4 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 5-144.
72. Council Resolution, supra note 71, at 4.
73. The Economic and Social Committee is an advisory body set up by the EEC
PART-TIME WOMEN WORKERS
time workers should be paid the same hourly wage as full-time
workers."4 The Commission wrote that "in the presence of
both male and female employees, part-time work is to be paid
at the same time rate as full-time work and in strict proportion
to the number of hours worked always provided the work is
'equal.' -5 Thus, article 119 should be read to require that
part-time workers receive the same hourly rate as full-time
workers 76
On April 1, 1982, the Commission submitted the Proposal
for a Council Directive on Voluntary Part-time Work' 7 (Propo-
sal). The report concerns part-time workers only, and while
the scope of the Proposal is equal treatment for part-time
workers, it does not include a provision for equal pay. 78 The
absence of such a provision for equal pay can be attributed to
the fact that equal pay was already provided for in article 119
and Directive 75/117 .79 The Commission believed that those
laws already applied to part-time workers;8 0 it did nol. consider
it necessary to include a repetitive provision in the Proposal.
Moreover, it is consistent with the basic aim of the Treaty that
part-time workers should be paid the same hourly wage, so
that those member states that do not have a large part-time
Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 193. Before the Commission makes a recom-
mendation to the Council or Assembly it first accepts the opinion of the Economic
and Social Committee. A. WALSH &J. PAXTON, supra note 5, at 37.
74. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 54 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
269) 57 (1978).
75. Barrett, supra note 3, at 183 (quoting from Written Observations of the
Commission 9 (unpublished remarks)).
76. Barrett, supra note 3, at 189-90.
77. 93 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 62) 7 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,358, at 10,773.
78. Id. art. 2. Article 2 outlines the equal treatment principle:
Part-time workers shall not be discriminated against as compared with full-
time workers in respect of working conditions, rules governing dismissal,
entitlement to participate actively or passively in bodies representing em-
ployees and access to vocational training, promotion, social facilities and
medical care. This is hereinafter referred to as the 'principle of non-dis-
crimination'.
Id. The principle of nondiscrimination attempts to protect part-time employees from
unfair working conditions. See id.
79. See supra notes 19, 66.
80. See supra notes 70-71, 74-76 and accompanying text.
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labor force are not competitively disadvantaged.8 '
B. United Kingdom Laws
Tribunals have encountered two problems in their inter-
pretation of United Kingdom statutes on equal pay rights. The
first is the ambiguity of the language of the Equal Pay Act. A
second problem is whether both United Kingdom statutes pro-
hibit indirect discrimination and, if so, in what manner.
1. Ambiguity of the Equal Pay Act
The purpose of the Equal Pay Act is "to prevent discrimi-
nation as regards terms and conditions of employment be-
tween men and women."' 82 It does this by requiring an equal-
ity clause to be implied in employment contracts.83 The equal-
ity clause in this situation is an implied provision in a woman's
contract that causes terms in her contract to be either modified
if the terms are discriminatory or implied if terms are omit-
ted.84 The equality clause is implied in two situations. First,
where a woman is doing work "equivalent" to that performed
by a man,85 and second, where a woman performs "like
work. ' 86 For instance, if there is a term benefitting a man in
his employment contract and there is no corresponding benefi-
cial term in the woman's contract, the term is implied in a
woman's contract. If a term in a woman's contract is or be-
comes less favorable than in a man's contract, then the term is
deemed modified by the equality clause.
The Equal Pay Act provides that equal pay be given for
"like work."' 87 A woman performs "like work" when she per-
forms work which is the "same or. . .broadly similar" to work
done by a man.88 Equal pay must also be given to a female
worker for work which is rated as "equivalent" to a man's
work. 89 This last provision is similar to the provision in the
81. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85; see Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at
930, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 30.
82. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, preamble.
83. Id. § 1; see Steiner, supra note 4, at 400-01.
84. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § l(2)(a)-(b).
85. Id. § 1(2)(b); see Steiner, supra note 4, at 400-01.
86. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(2)(a).
87. Id. § 1(2)(a).
88. Id. § 1(4).
89. Id. § l(2)(b).
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ILO Convention and Directive 75/117 that provides for equal
pay for work of "equal value." 9°
While courts have consistently found part-time employ-
ment to fall within the ambit of "like work" as it is defined in
section 1(4) of the Equal Pay Act,91 a troublesome question is
whether in practice the Equal Pay Act applies to part-time fe-
male workers at all. Under section 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act,
an equality clause is not implied in a woman's employment
contract if the "employer proves that the variation [in treat-
ment] is genuinely due to a material difference (other than the
difference of sex) between her case and his." 92 If the employer
can show that the reason he paid a part-time female employee
a lower hourly wage than the wage paid a full-time male em-
ployee was because of a "material difference" between them,
then he has not violated the Equal Pay Act. 93 This exception to
the application of an equality clause has become a loophole.9 4
Once again, the vagueness of the language leads to uncertainty
in its application by the courts. 95 There is no definition of
what constitutes a "material difference" between a male and
female worker, and there has been no guidance from Parlia-
ment on this issue. 96 When considering this exception in part-
time employment cases, the courts have questioned whether a
difference in the number of hours that a part-time female em-
ployee works as compared to the number of hours a full-time
male employee works can constitute a "material difference"
justifying a difference in pay.97
90. See supra notes 52, 66.
.91. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(4). This section defines "like work" as the
"same or a broadly similar nature" to a comparable man's work. Id.; 5ee infra notes
164-65 and accompanying text.
92. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(3) (emphasis added).
93. See id.
94. Townshend-Smith, supra note 4, at 82. It has been described as a loophole
in that "[w]hat would ... be accepted as a genuine material difference may conceal
either deliberate manipulation or unverified assumptions as to the types of qualities
or results . . . [from part-time workers]." Id.
95. See infra notes 223-48 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 226, 232, 239 and accompanying text.
97. See Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Bd. E. Dist. (Empl. App. Trib. Oct. 26,
1983) (available Mar. 1985, on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file); Albion Shipping
Agency v. Arnold, 1982 Indus. Cas. R. 23 (Emp. App. Trib.); Clarke, 1982 Indus. Rel.
L.R. 482;Jenkins 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 911, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24: (Preliminary
Ruling), remanded, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. 388 (Emp. App. Trib.).
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The United Kingdom Department of Employment 98 sug-
gested "that the Act covered all full or part-time employees
although the Act makes no reference to the latter group. ' 9
Because Parliament has not stated its intention as to whether
the Equal Pay Act's provision for "material difference" should
apply to part-time workers, the Department of Employment's
interpretation, as an integral part of the implementation of the
Equal Pay Act, should be given considerable weight.'0 0
2. Indirect Discrimination
The Sex Discrimination Act is broader than the Equal Pay
Act in that it prohibits discrimination in all areas of life,
whereas the Equal Pay Act only considers discrimination in
employment situations.10' However, the Sex Discrimination
Act was enacted not only to extend discrimination laws to
nonemployment situations but also to broaden the scope of
the Equal Pay Act in an employment situation. 10 2
The Equal Pay Act only covers direct discrimination. 10
This means that it only prohibits obvious cases of discrimina-
tory practices and policies of employers. The Sex Discrimina-
tion Act attacks indirect discrimination where policies and
practices of the employer appear gender-neutral but, in effect,
discriminate against women.1t 4 The Sex Discrimination Act,
98. The Department of Employment is one of 14 principle departments in Mrs.
Thatcher's Government. T. HARTLEY & J. GRIFFITH, GOVERNMENT AND LAW 57 (2d
ed. 1981). The Department of Employment, formerly called the Department of Em-
ployment and Productivity, is a policy-making department. It lays down policies and
forms the structures of the labor department so that the policies may be carried out.
F. WRIGHT, BRITISH CONSTITUTION & GOVERNMENT 124 (2d ed. 1973). It is responsi-
ble for "industrial relations, pay policy, employment, training, and related manpower
questions . . . ." Id. at 132.
99. Chiplin & Sloane, supra note 29, at 21.
100. See generally F. WRIGHT, supra note 98, at 124 (discussing the functions of
the Department of Employment).
101. Compare Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 with Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch.
41, § 1. See generally Steiner, supra note 4, at 402 ("the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
supplements the Equal Pay Act by the application of the principle of non-discrimina-
tion").
102. See Steiner, supra note 4, at 402.
103. See Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(3); see also Steiner, supra note 4, at 400
("the Act's scope is limited by applying only where the terms and conditions form
part of the contract").
104. See Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 1(b); see also Steiner, supra note
4, at 400.
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however, was written to complement the Equal Pay Act;' 0 5 the
Acts are intended to be read in conjunction with one an-
other.10 6 Because the two Acts are read as a "single code,"10 7
cases of indirect discrimination have been brought successfully
in worker pay disputes.' 0
However, courts have not yet determined whether the
provision in the Sex Discrimination Act for indirect discrimina-
tion should be applied in cases of unintentional indirect dis-
crimination.' 0 9 There are two types of indirect discrimination:
intentional and unintentional."'0 Intentional indirect discrimi-
nation occurs when an employer discriminates against part-
time workers because they are women.' 1 ' Usually, an em-
ployer in this type of case is unable to prove that there is a
reason for paying part-time workers less money, and in fact,
the real reason is that they are women." 2 Unintentional indi-
rect discrimination occurs when an employer has a bona fide
business reason for distinguishing between part-time workers
and full-time workers but the policy or practice discriminates
primarily against women.' 13
Whether unintentional indirect discrimination should be
prohibited is a crucial question in part-time employment
cases.114 The courts must decide whether the employer should
have to prove that his reason for discriminating is objectively
correct,' 15 and even if he proves that he has a reason to dis-
criminate, whether he should still be allowed to pay the part-
time workers less if they are women.
105. Steiner, supra note 4, at 400.
106. Id.
107. Barrett, supra note 3, at 177.
108. See, e.g., Clay Cross Ltd. v. Fletcher, 1978 Indus. Cas. R. 1, 9 (Empl. App.
Trib.).
109. Barrett, supra note 3, at 176; see infra notes 223-39 and accompanying text.
110. Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393; see Barrett, supra note 3, at 176;
Steiner, supra note 4, at 402.
111. Barrett, supra note 3, at 176.
112. See id.
113. Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393; see Barrett, supra note 3, at 176.
114. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 179-80.
115. See id. at 177. Objectively correct means that the "achievement of some
economic benefit can be objectively demonstrated." See id. An employer is "subjec-
tively correct" when he can show that he had a bona fide motive, but he does not
have to prove his motive is actually achieved. See id.
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The Trade Union and Labor Relations Act1 16 gave the in-
dustrial tribunals" 7 the power to hear sex discrimination
cases." 8 These cases are then appealed from the industrial tri-
bunal to the EAT." 9 However, a decision of the industrial tri-
bunal does not create binding precedent. 20 Therefore, there
are disparate decisions made on similar issues in part-time em-
ployment discrimination cases.' 2'
3. Interaction Between the Laws of the EEC
and United Kingdom
According to the "doctrine of primacy," EEC law takes
precedence over a member state's national law,' 22 if the EEC
law in question confers greater rights upon the individuals of
member states. 23  Therefore, if article 119 confers greater
equal pay rights upon female workers than the rights conferred
by the Equal Pay Act or Sex Discrimination Act, article 119
takes precedence. 24  Moreover, the European Communities
116. Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52.
117. Industrial tribunals were established in 1964. R. RIDEOUT, supra note 6, at
1. They adjudicate disputes concerning unfair dismissal, time off work, maternity
rights, equal pay claims, etc. Id.
118. Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 16; see Seear, supra
note 34, at 149.
119. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 114.
120. Id.
121. See infra notes 223-39 and accompanying text.
122. Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 585, 593, [1961-1966 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT REP. (CCH) 8023, at 7384, 7390. "[T~he [Member]
States have united their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields, and thus created a
body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves." Id.; see also Steiner,
supra note 4, at 416 (discussing primacy of EEC law); Freestone, Unenforceable Commu-
nity Rights, 41 MOD. L.R. 346, 346 (1978) (discussing the European Communities
Act).
123. See Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 394 ("[i]t would not contravene s.2 of
the European Communities Act if the United Kingdom statutes conferred on employ-
ees greater rights than they enjoy under Article 119.").
124. Id. This issue arose in Albion Shipping Agency v. Arnold, 1982 Indus. Cas.
R. 24 (Emp. App. Trib.) concerning contemporaneous versus noncontemporaneous
employment. The tribunal held that the Equal Pay Act does not apply to situations of
noncontemporaneous employment, where a woman compares her position to that of
her male predecessor. Id. at 25. While the Equal Pay Act only applies where employ-
ment is contemporaneous, the tribunal held that article 119 of the EEC Treaty ap-
plies to both contemporaneous and noncontemporaneous employment. Id. More-
over, because the European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, confers a separate right
on women in the United Kingdom, Albion Shipping, 1982 Indus. Cas. R. at 25-26, a
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Act 2 5 statutorily mandates that EEC rights, remedies, and ob-
ligations are to be given effect in the United Kingdom without
any further legislative action by the United Kingdom.'
26
III. CASES
Two controversial issues arise in part-time employment
discrimination cases. First, the courts have not resolved the
question of whether indirect discrimination has to be inten-
tional to be prohibited, or whether unintentional indirect dis-
crimination should be prohibited as well. The second issue is
whether a difference in the number of working hours consti-
tutes a "material difference" within the meaning of section
1(3) of the Equal Pay Act.'1 7
The courts have used four different approaches in analyz-
ing indirect discrimination and material difference.' 2 8 They
are:
A) The difference between part-time and full-time working
will always be regarded as sufficient, in itself, to consti-
tute a material difference (unless the applicant is able to
show that the employer's real motive for making this dis-
tinction is to discriminate against women) ....
B) The difference between part and full-time working is ca-
pable of constituting a material difference, provided that
the employer has a genuine business-related motive for
making the distinction other than a desire to discrimi-
nate against women ....
C) The difference between part and full-time working is ca-
pable of constituting a material difference, but only if
the employer proves that it is objectively necessary to
achieve some business-related purpose . ...
D) The difference between part and full-time working can
never constitute a material difference. Any economic
benefit gained from such a wage differential is a factor
personal to the employer and has nothing to do with
"her case and his" for the purposes of section 1(3). ' 29
female worker could compare herself with a male worker who had worked previously.
Id.
125. 1972, ch. 68.
126. Id. § 2.
127. See infra notes 161-215 and accompanying text.
128. Barrett, supra note 3, at 177.
129. Id.
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In the first approach, indirect discrimination would not be pro-
hibited. Even if an employer's policies had a disproportionate
adverse effect upon women, the difference in the working
hours between a full-time male employee and part-time female
employee could still constitute a material difference.13' Thus,
an equality clause would not be applied in a woman's contract,
ensuring her an equal wage, unless the employer was inten-
tionally directly discriminating against women.' 13  With this
approach a woman must prove that the employer had an intent
to discriminate. 132
The second approach prohibits intentional indirect dis-
crimination. In order to prevail, a woman must prove either
that the employer was intentionally discriminating against wo-
men or that an employer's policies had an adverse effect upon
women.13 3 If the policy or practice does have an adverse effect
upon women, the burden shifts to the employer who must then
prove that he had a business-related motive for indirectly dis-
criminating. 13
4
The third approach again prohibits intentional discrimina-
tion, but in comparison to the second approach, it imposes a
much greater burden of proof upon the employer. If a woman
can demonstrate that her employer's practice or policy had a
disproportionate effect upon women, the employer must both
show that he had a business-related motive for indirectly dis-
criminating, 35 and prove that his discriminatory practice or
policy was "objectively necessary to achieve" his motive. 36
While the second approach suggests a subjective standard, the
third approach suggests a more objective standard. Only if the
employer meets this heavy burden of proof can a difference
between a part-time worker and a full-time worker constitute a
material difference. 3  This approach falls somewhere be-
tween a ban on intentional indirect discrimination and a ban
on unintentional discrimination. However, it is not an explicit
130. Id. at 176-77.
131. See Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(1).
132. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 176-77.
133. Id. at 177.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
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ban on unintentional discrimination. The discriminatory prac-
tice will still be allowed, if an employer has bona fide, verifiable
reasons for discriminating against part-time workers, even if
the policy has a disproportionate, adverse effect upon wo-
men.13 8
In the last approach, any form of indirect discrimination,
intentional or unintentional, is prohibited and no economic
benefit to the employer would constitute a material differ-
ence.' 39 Obviously, this approach provides the greatest pro-
tection for a female worker in a discrimination suit.' 40
The courts in the United Kingdom and the EEC have used
these types of approaches to decide part-time employment dis-
crimination cases. While the reasoning of the third and fourth
approaches were exemplified by earlier cases, the later cases
fall somewhere between the second and third approach.' 41
The next section will chronologically examine not only part-
time employment cases but also those full-time eniployment
cases which have affected the decisions in part-time employ-
ment cases. The seminal case concerning part-time employ-
ment is Jenkins v. Kingsgate.'42
A. Pre-Jenkins v. Kingsgate Cases
Clay Cross Ltd. v. Fletcher'43 is a full-time employment dis-
crimination case.' 44 It sets a precedent for future pay discrimi-
nation cases, and especially for part-time employment cases
because it renders a liberal reading of "material difference"
138. See id This approach "represents a kind of half-way house, in which de facto
discrimination is primafacie unlawful, but business values are allowed to prevail where
the achievement of some economic benefit can be objectively demonstrated." Id. A
second problem with this requirement is that "[t]he necessity is always that of the
employer, the tribunal is not to consider the needs of the individual, applicant or
female workers as a whole." Townshend-Smith, supra note 4, at 94.
139. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 177.
140. See id. at 178.
141. See generally id. at 178-92 (discussing the presentation of all four approaches
to the British courts).
142. 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 911, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24 (Preliminary Rul-
ing), remanded, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. 388 (Empi. App. Trib.). This case was first
brought in an industrial tribunal. 1981 Indus. Rel. L. R. 6 (Empl. App. Trib.) It was
appealed to the EAT which brought a proceeding pursuant to article 177 to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
143. 1979 Indus. Cas. R. I (Empl. App. Trib.).
144. Id. at 3.
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and indirect discrimination.' 4 5
Mrs. Fletcher worked at Clay Cross for three years when it
hired a man to work for a higher salary at the same job.14 6
There was one other woman who received the same salary as
Mrs. Fletcher." 7 The company argued that it had to hire the
man at a higher salary because there was no other qualified
candidate who could be hired at Mrs. Fletcher's salary."' 8
In an unanimous decision, the court held that even though
the employer did not intend to discriminate against Mrs.
Fletcher, the lack of intention was no excuse. "49 The employer
indirectly discriminated against women by paying its male em-
ployee a higher wage than it paid its female employees who
were doing the same job.150 The court reasoned that while the
Equal Pay Act does not literally prohibit indirect discrimina-
tion, the Sex Discrimination Act does. Therefore, because the
Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act should be read
as one body of law, indirect discrimination is prohibited under
both statutes.' 5 1
Furthermore, the court decided that the employer could
not forego its obligation not to discriminate by equating "ex-
trinsic forces" with "material difference."' 15 2 The court based
its decision on a literal statutory reading of section 1(3) of the
Equal Pay Act.' 53 The section provides that a comparison has
to be made between "her case and his" in order to constitute a
material difference.' 54 A determination of what constitutes a
material difference should lie in the personal equation of the
two people, i.e. personal skill, responsibility, duration of em-
ployment, etc., and not business or economic factors. 15 5 The
court held that the particular "extrinsic force" in Clay Cross was
145. Id. at 5; see Barrett, supra note 3, at 179. See generally supra notes 141-45 and
accompanying text (discussing the liberal interpretation under Barret's fourth ap-
proach).
146. Clay Cross, 1979 Indus. Cas. R. at 3.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 5; see Barrett, supra note 3, at 179.
150. Clay Cross, 1979 Indus. Cas. R. at 9.
151. Id. "The overall object of both Acts is to ensure that women are treated no
less favourable than men." Id.
152. Id. at 5.
153. See id.
154. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41, § 1(3).
155. Clay Cross, 1979 Indus. Cas. R. at 5.
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a "general bargaining factor common to any. applicant."' 56
The court also stated that it would be contrary to the intention
of article 119 to allow extrinsic forces or market forces to be
considered an exception to the law. 157
*According to the three judge panel, only a personal factor
can satisfy the requirement for a material difference in pay be-
tween a female worker and a male worker.'5 8 This case pro-
vides the most liberal statutory reading of the EEC and United
Kingdom equal pay acts.' 59 It is evident the judges in later
cases sought to distinguish their cases from the holding in Clay
Cross. 160
The first part-time employment discrimination case to
construe Clay Cross was Handley v. Mono.' 61 It concerned a part-
time woman machinist whose hourly wages were less than that
of a full-time male machinist. 162 Only women were allowed to
work part-time at this company. 6 '
The tribunal found that Mrs. Handley did perform work
which was "in all respects similar" to what was done by the
man with whom she is being compared. 64 However, the tribu-
nal decided, by purporting to follow the Clay Cross decision
concerning "material difference," that the number of hours
each person worked and the economic ramifications of the dif-
ferent hours fit into their respective personal equations.1 65 As
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id. at 10-11.
158. Id. at 5, 9, & 12. The three judge panel decided that the variation between
a woman's wages and a man's wages must be due to a personal factor by literally
examining the Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 § 1(3). This section reads "variation is
genuinely due to a material difference . . . between her case and his." Id. These last
four words, "her case and his" were especially important to this court. Clay Cross,
1979 Indus. Cas. R. at 9. Since this clause says that the variation must be due to a
difference between her case and his, the variation cannot be due to an extrinsic cir-
cumstance, like an economic factor. See id. It may only be "what appertains to her in
her job, such as the qualifications she brought to it, the length of time she has been in
it, the skill she has acquired. . .. It is on this kind of basis that her case is to be
compared with that of the man's." Id. at 9-10.
159. Barrett, supra note 3, at 179.
160. See, e.g., Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Bd. E. Dist. (Empl. App. Trib.
Oct. 26, 1983) (available Mar. 1985, on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file); Handley,
1978 Indus. Rel. L.R. 534.
161. Handley, 1978 Indus. Rel. L.R. 534.
162. Id. at 535.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 537. It "is right to put in to the personal equation the fact that
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a result, Mrs. Handley contributed less to overall production
and to the utilization of the equipment than her male counter-
part. Therefore, the company decided that she should be paid
less. 6 6 The tribunal supported this argument by drawing an
analogy to the length of service.' 67 The court argued that be-
cause length of service fit into the personal equations 68 of em-
ployees, the number of working hours should also be among
the criteria for the personal equation. t69 The decision in Han-
dley seems to follow Clay Cross as it does not confer as much
protection for the female worker.17 0 First, it is questionable
whether underutilization of equipment would fit into Mrs.
Handley's personal equation as the opinion reasoned.' 7 ' Sec-
ond, it is questionable whether part-time employment causes
underutilization of equipment. 7 2 Whether the latter allega-
tion was correct or not, the court still held it was a valid busi-
ness-related motive. 73 The tribunal thus approved a subjec-
tive standard because the business-related motive does not
have to be proven; a nondiscriminatory motive is enough. The
Clay Cross decision, however, held that all indirect discrimina-
tion was prohibited.' 
74
B. Jenkins v. Kingsgate
Mrs. Jenkins was a special machinist who worked approxi-
mately thirty hours a week. 175 Prior to 1975, there was no dif-
Mrs. Handley was working ... less hours a week ... and that her machine would
* . .have been out of use .... " Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 536.
168. Id.; see, e.g., E. Coombes Ltd. v. Shields, 1978 Indus. Rel. L.R. 263.
169. Handley, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 536.
170. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 178.
171. Id.
172. See Townshend-Smith, supra note 4, at 82.
173. See Handley, 1978 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 537. Thus, the tribunal followed the
second approach in Barrett's system. Compare Barrett, supra note 3, at 177 and supra
text accompanying notes 133-34 with Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393 ("[i]t
would not be enough simply to show that the employer had an intention to achieve
some other legitimate objective .... The employer would have to show that the pay
differential actually achieved that different objective.") The employer could not just
submit that he had a nondiscriminatory objective. He had to actually prove that that
objective was achieved by paying the part-time worker a lower wage, illustrating court
imposition of Barret's third approach. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
174. Clay Cross, 1979 Indus. Cas. R. at 5; see Barrett, supra note 3, at 179.
175. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 914, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 27.
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ference between part-time workers' and full-time workers'
wages, butthere was a difference in the wages of female work-
ers and male workers.176 After 1975, the year the Equal Pay
Act went into effect, the reverse situation occurred.' 77 At the
time Mrs. Jenkins applied to the tribunal there were only fe-
male part-time workers.17 8 By the time of the hearing, a male
part-time worker had been employed.179 He had been asked to
stay on after his retirement, when he began to work sixteen
hours a week.' 80
The British EAT asked the European Court ofJustice how
article 119 applied to this case.' The Advocate General 8 2
initially advised that the wording of article 119 did not create a
prima facie case for Mrs. Jenkins.' Subparagraph (b) of the
article states that pay for "time rates shall be the same for the
same job."'' 8 4 According to the Advocate General, the terms
"same job" and "equal work" are different. 8 5 Part-time work-
ers do "equal work" and are thus entitled to the overall protec-
tions of article 119, but not to the specific provisions in sub-
paragraph (b).'8 6
The Advocate General's opinion specifically limit:s the ap-
176. Id. at 929, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 29.
177. Id.
178. Jenkins, Indus. Rel. L.R. at 390.
179. Id. at 391.
180. Id.
181. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 914, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 27-28.
EEC member states may petition the European Court ofJustice to give a preliminary
ruling on an issue. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177. "Where such a question is
raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it
considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment,
request the Court ofJustice to give a ruling thereon." Id. This is important when a
national court or tribunal is faced with an issue which necessitates an interpretation
of EEC law since, if the EEC law confers greater rights, then EEC law will take prece-
dence over a member state's national law. See supra note 123.
182. The EEC Treaty empowers the Advocate General to "present publicly,
with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned conclusions on cases submit-
ted to the Court ofJustice." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 166. It is the Advocate
General's duty to assist the court. The Advocate General submits findings of the
facts and present impartial legal arguments, both of which "form a valuable basis for
the decision" of the court. P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 88 (1973).
183. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 934, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 33.
184. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 119(b).
185. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 934, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 33.
186. See id. at 933, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 33.
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plication of the Clay Cross decisions in this case: "I can find no
support in the Clay Cross case for wide proposition[s] . . .that
any commercial benefit that an employer may obtain from dif-
ferentiating between categories of workers is irrelevant."18 7
He further states that Clay Cross would be applicable if the
''real" reason why the employer paid the part-time workers
less was because "part-time workers were generally women
whose bargaining position was weaker than that of men, or
that differentiation was a hangover from the days when the re-
spondent paid all its female employees at lower rates than its
male employees." ' 8 Thus, the Advocate General states that
direct discrimination is prohibited.'8 9 He also states that indi-
rect discrimination was prohibited if an employee has to work a
certain number of hours per week to earn a higher wage, and
the requirement has a disproportionate adverse impact upon
women employees.190 In such an instance, an employer would
have to show some special justification for his discriminatory
practice.' 9 ' However, the Advocate General in Jenkins would
not prohibit unintentional, indirect discrimination,192 He
seems to find some middle ground between intentional indi-
rect discrimination and unintentional indirect discrimination.
Within the Jenkins opinion the court vacillates. 193 Upon
remand to the United Kingdom, the concept stated in para-
graph 14 was interpreted as the court's holding.' 94 Paragraph
14 of the judgment states that the courts of each member state
should decide whether a difference in pay between a part-time
worker and a full-time worker amounts to discrimination by
looking at the "facts of the case, its history and the employer's
intention .. . ."9' If the employer states that he did not in-
tend to discriminate by paying his part-time workers a lower
wage, it would not matter if all the part-time workers were wo-
men. Thus, the court chooses to prohibit only direct discrimi-
nation; if an employer has no intention to discriminate, then it
187. Id. at 935, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 33-34.
188. Id., 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 34.
189. See id.; Barrett, supra note 3, at 184.
190. See Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 936, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 34.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 935-36, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 33-34; Barrett, supra note 3, at 184.
193. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 184.
194. Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393.
195. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 926, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 40.
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does not matter that he indirectly discriminates against wo-
men. 1
9 6
However, in paragraph 12 of the judgment the coart states
that if the reasons for paying part-time workers a lower rate are
economic, they must be "objectively justified."' 97 Thus, there
is an inconsistency in the court's opinion between paragraph
12 and paragraph 14.19s In paragraph 12, the court prohibits
not only direct discrimination, as in paragraph 14, but- indirect
discrimination as well.' 99 Furthermore, it imposes an objective
standard upon the employer to prove that he had a good rea-
son for discriminating. 2° ° Thus, the court rejects the subjec-
tive approach espoused in Handley v. Mono.2° '
It is still difficult to discern how liberal the court intended
its decision to be.20 2 The court held that:
a difference in pay between full-time workers and part-time
workers does not amount to discrimination prohibited by
Article 119 of the Treaty, unless it is in reality merely an
indirect way of reducing the level of pay of part-time work-
ers on the ground that that group of workers is composed
exclusively or predominantly of women. 20 3
It is uncertain whether this language means that all the em-
ployer must do is disprove his discriminatory intent, as the
court stated in paragraph 14, or that the employer must objec-
tively justify his discriminatory practice as stated in paragraph
12.204
The court's discussion of the Clay Cross20 5 decision is clear.
Paragraph 12 of the judgment states that a factor such as an
economic benefit to the employer that encourages "full-time
work irrespective of the sex of the worker" can justify paying a
part-time worker a lower wage.20 6 Thus this court, interpret-
196. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 184-85.
197. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 925, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 40.
198. See Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393.
199. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 925-26, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 40; see
Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393; Barrett, supra note 3, at 184-85.
200. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 925, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 40.
201. See id.
202. Jenkins, 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 393; Barrett, supra note 3, at 185.
203. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 926, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 40-41.
204. Barrett, supra note 3, at 185.
205. 1979 Indus. Cas. R. 1 (Empl. App. Trib.).
206. Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 925, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.P. at 40.
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ing article 119, effectively dismisses the Clay Cross decision that
held that extrinsic forces, such as economic considerations,
could not justify paying a lower wage to a part-time worker.207
Jenkins was remanded with the answers provided by the
European Court of Justice to the EAT.20 8 These answers were
ambiguous. The EAT was left "in considerable doubt as to the
effect of Article 119 in relation to unintentional indirect dis-
crimination. ' 20 9 The EAT believed that the formal ruling of
the European Court of Justice was that only direct discrimina-
tion was prohibited. All the employer had to do was disprove
any intent to discriminate.21 0
However, the EAT believed that the Equal Pay Act and the
Sex Discrimination Act went further than the European Court
of Justice's interpretation of article 119.211 Therefore, it ruled
that the employer had to actually prove that the nondiscrimi-
natory objective that the employer sought by paying the part-
time worker a lower hourly wage was actually achieved.21 2
The EAT's decision in Jenkins does not go as far as Clay
Cross in its assessment of the interpretation of section 3 of the
Equal Pay Act. However, the objective standard posed by the
EAT in Jenkins would probably be difficult to meet.213
Although arguments are made that part-time workers cost
more for the employer, there have been few statistical analyses
done on the costs of hiring part-time workers.21 4 Jenkins seems
to signal that fewer employers would prevail in future pay dis-
putes because the employers would have to prove that they did
achieve their economic objectives.21 5
207. Id.
208. 1981 Indus. Rel. L.R. 388.
209. Id. at 393.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 394.
212. Id.
213. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 177, 188-89.
214. Robinson, supra note 2, at 306. "Two-thirds of firms considered that the
costs [for a firm to hire part-time workers] were less than 5% of their total wage bill,
while for a handful of firms, the estimate was in excess of 20%." Townshend-Smith,
supra note 4, at 82.
215. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 177. There is a much heavier burden of proof
on the employer to actually prove that he achieves a goal by paying his part-time
workers less. Id.
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C. Post-Jenkins Decisions
There are three post-Jenkins cases that have had an impact
upon part-time worker cases. Two of them are full-time em-
ployment cases. One is a part-time employment case.
In Albion Shipping Agency Ltd. v. Arnold,2 1 6 the complainant
was hired to do the same type work as her predecessor, but the
volume of work was less than that of her predecessor. 21 7 Her
salary was less than his had been.2 8 The EAT held that be-
cause the woman was comparing herself to a man who no
longer worked for the same company, article 119 governed the
case and not the equal pay laws of the United Kingdom, which
cover contemporaneous employment.21 9
The issue facing the EAT was whether economic circum-
stances are sufficient to constitute a "material difference. '220
The tribunal held that if the employment had been contempo-
raneous, then the Equal Pay Act would govern the case and,
under Clay Cross, those economic considerations would not
constitute a "material difference."' 22 ' However, because the
employment was not contemporaneous,Jenkins, not the Equal
Pay Act would apply.2 2 2 The EAT made a point of emphasizing
the difference between the Jenkins and the Clay Cross deci-
sions. 223 The court's interpretation of material difference in
Clay Cross was attempting to produce harmony between the
laws of the EEC and the United Kingdom. 224 As the EAT
pointed out, however, the Jenkins decision by the European
Court of Justice produced "pronounced dissonance" between
the equal pay laws of the United Kingdom and the EEC. 2 25 It
therefore "express[ed] the hope that Parliament" would rectify
the situation. 2 6 The best way to do so, the tribunal believed,
would be to amend the Equal Pay Act to conform with theJen-
216. 1982 Indus. Cas. R. 23 (Empl. App. Trib.).
217. Id. at 24.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 25; see supra note 124.
220. Albion Shipping, 1982 Indus. Cas. R. at 26.
221. Id. at 28.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 27.
225. Id. at 28.
226. Id. at 30.
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kins decision.2 27
The EAT in the next case, Clarke v. Eley, disagreed.228 In
this case all the part-time workers at the firm were women.229
The firm had to fire workers because of redundancy, and its
policy was to fire part-time workers before firing full-time
workers. 230 The EAT found that the firm's policy was unlaw-
fully discriminatory. 23 I Although the court perceived a "pro-
nounced dissonance," this panel stated that if the issue was
presented to Parliament that the panel would, unlike the tribu-
nal in Albion, "express some apprehension as to the direction
in which the decisions of the courts are going on this issue. ' 232
Parliament should clearly identify the priority it gave indirect
discrimination.23 In this tribunal's opinion, Parliament
should extend the rights of women workers under the Equal
Pay Act. 23 4 Once the wording of the Equal Pay Act was less
ambiguous, the decisions of the industrial tribunals would be
in greater harmony with one another. The discrepancy be-
tween Clay Cross and Jenkins decisions has left industrial tribu-
nals and EAT's appealing for some sort of guidance on how to
decide subsequent cases concerning indirect discrimination
and material difference. 5
The EAT, in the 1983 case, Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health
Board Eastern District23 6 stated that because the court of appeal
was a higher court, it lacked authority to overturn the decision
of Clay Cross.23 7 Yet, although the EAT in this case accepted
227. See id. at 26-27.
228. 1982 Indus. Rel. L.R. 482, 487 (Empl. App. Trib.). In this case the tribunal
held that it was grossly discriminatory to fire part-time workers before firing full-time
workers when part-time workers were 100% women. Id. at 487.
229. Id. at 484.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 487.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See generally id. at 485 ("[t]he purpose of the legislature in introducing the
concept of indirect discrimination . . . was to seek to eliminate those practices which
had a disproportionate impact on women .... "); id. at 487 ("[i]n our view, the law
should lay down the degree of importance to be attached to eliminating indirect dis-
crimination . . . so that Industrial Tribunals" will know how to decide cases).
235. Id. at 487; see also Albion Shipping, 1982 Indus. Cas. R. at 30 (expressing the
hope that Parliament would amend the Equal Pay Act).
236. (Empl. App. Trib. Oct. 26, 1983) (available Mar. 1985, on LEXIS, Enggen
library, Cases file).
237. Id.
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the Clay Cross decision, it expressed its belief that the decision
placed an undue burden upon the employer, because the em-
ployer could not use economic considerations to justify a lowerhourly wage to part-time workers.23 8 The tribunal believed
that section 3 was not meant to place such a heavy burden of
proof upon the employer.3 9
IV. ANALYSIS
The language of article 119 appears to end discrimination
against part-time female workers by providing that part-time
workers should receive hourly wages equal to full-time work-
ers. However, the European Court of Justice has not inter-
preted the statute in this manner. 240 Thus, it has not imple-
mented the drafter's intentions. The EEC was formed to har-
monize the laws of the member states in order 1Lo form a
common market. 241' Article 119 is not only an instrument to
achieve the social policy aims of the EEC Treaty, but an instru-
ment to further the economic aims of the EEC.242 It will cause
a distortion in the markets of the various member states if the
United Kingdom has a cheaper source of labor than the other
member states.243
The European Court of Justice's motive in being restric-
tive in the Jenkins decision was to "put the onus upon national
courts and legislatures to take action. ' 244 If that was the
court's objective, however, its decision in Jenkins, undermining
Clay Cross, does not coincide with their stated motive. Clay
Cross stood for the proposition that extrinsic forces such as
economic considerations or business circumstances could not
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 182-207 and accompanying text; see also Barrett, supra note
3, at 189-90 (discussing the aims of the current policy of the EEC).
241. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2; see also supra note 16 and accompanying
text (discussing the broad purpose of the EEC).
242. See generally Barrett, supra note 3, at 189 (the "economic aim of article 119"
would not be fulfilled if part-time workers were not paid the same hourly wage as full-
time workers).
243. 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 5, at 3-762; E. STEIN, P. HAY & M.
WAELBROECK, supra note 22, at 1089.
244. Szyscak, Differences in Pay for Part-time Work, 44 MOD. L. REV. 672, 681
(1981).
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constitute a material difference.2" 5 Therefore, by undermining
Clay Cross it becomes questionable whether the European
Court of Justice is committed to enforcing article 119.246 The
European Court of Justice is given great power to determine
the interpretation and implementation of the laws of the
EEC.2 4 7 Unfortunately, the manner in which the court has in-
terpreted article 119 to apply to part-time workers is not how
the legislative and administrative bodies of the EEC intend it
to be interpreted. Moreover, it has caused a "pronounced dis-
sonance" in the decisions following Jenkins. 248
However, this discrepancy in the decisions could be recti-
fied by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 249 The tribu-
nals in the United Kingdom have requested that Parliament
make some sort of decision concerning the Equal Pay Act and
the Sex Discrimination Act.250 Parliament did take some action
in 1983. As a result of a suit brought by the Commission
against the United Kingdom,25' the United Kingdom amended
section 1(3)-the material difference clause. The clause now
provides that if a woman is doing "like work," which all the
cases have held part-time workers to be doing, an employer
could only defend a variation in pay if it is due to a material
difference other than sex.252 However, if a woman does work
of equal value, then the variation may be due to a material dif-
ference.253
By making this distinction, Parliament has not clarified
what constitutes a material difference. It has done nothing to
245. Clay Cross, 1979 Indus. Cas. R. at 5; see supra notes 152-60 and accompany-
ing text.
246. Szyscak, supra note 244, at 681. See generally Barrett, supra note 3, at 189
(comparing the European Court ofJustice's zealous approach to national discrimina-
tion versus its "half-hearted" approach to sex discrimination).
247. Freestone, The European Court ofJustice in INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 43 J. Lodge ed. 1983). The European Court ofJustice is not
answerable to any other executive or administrative body. Id. The Council, although
it makes laws, cannot overturn an European Court ofJustice decision by a legislative
act. Id. Yet, the Court of Justice may overturn an act of the Council. Id.
248. See supra notes 216-39 and accompanying text.
249. Clarke, 1982 Indus. Rel. L.R. at 487.
250. See supra notes 226, 233, 239 and accompanying text.
251. Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2601, [1981-
1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8853, at 8051; see supra notes 12-
14 and accompanying text.
252. Equal Pay Act 1970, ch. 41 amended by STAT. INST. 1983/1794.
253. STAT. INST. 1983/1794, reg. 2(2).
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ensure a consistent application of the equal pay laws of the
United Kingdom and the EEC to part-time workers. It is still
necessary for Parliament to amend the equal pay laws to pro-
vide a definite method for the tribunals in the United Kingdom
to use in deciding part-time equal pay cases. Because of the
ambiguities the tribunals presently face, it is especially impor-
tant for Parliament to clearly define what constitutes a "mate-
rial difference." Unfortunately, Parliament did nothing to clar-
ify this problem when it amended the Equal Pay Act.
CONCLUSION
It is necessary for Parliament, the EEC, and the European
Court of Justice to emphasize the intention to eliminate wage
discrimination between female part-time workers and male
full-time workers. Part-time work is a vital and growing part of
the economy.25 4 The legislative and judicial bodies of the EEC
and the United Kingdom should not stymie the expansion of
part-time work by denying part-time workers the same rights
as full-time workers. The EEC and the European Court ofJus-
tice have a special responsibility. They were formed to protect.
free competition between the member states.255 It will cause
economic distortion between the member states if part-time
workers are not given the same rights as full-time workers.
The EEC and European Court of Justice must adhere to their
mandate in the EEC Treaty and grant part-time workers equal
pay rights.
Sabrina Allan
254. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 54 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 269) 57, 60 (1978); Robinson, supra note 2, at 299-301.
255. See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2 (the EEC was formed to "estab-
lish a common market"); id. art. 164 ("[t]he Court ofJustice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed").
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